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We structuraJly  analyze  a job search model for unemployed individu& that
allows jobs to have different wage/commuting-time  combinations. The
structural parameter of interest is the willingness to pay for commuting
time.  We use a unique dataset containing subjective  responses on the
optimal search strategy by unemployed individu& in order to estimate
this structural parameter without the need to rely  on strong functional
form assumptions. We pay special attention to specification  errors in the
model and to measurement errors in the data. The estimation results
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, a structural approach has become prominent in the empir-
ical analysis of individual unemployment durations and search behavior. In this
approach, the framework of job search theory is used explicitly in the empirical
analysis. In particular, the structural parameters of the job search model (i.e. the
parameters of the utility function and the distribution functions of the stochas-
tic events faced by the searcher) are estimated. The results enable a distinction
between choice and chance  components  of the exit rate  out of unemployment.
Moreover, the parameter estimates can be used to estimate elasticities of this
exit rate  with respect to its determinants. These in turn can be used for policy
analyses. Mortensen ( 1986) contains a survey of job search theory. See Flinn
and Heckman (1982),  Wolpin  (1987) and Van den Berg (1990a)  for examples of
structural empirical analyses. Wolpin (1992) surveys the empirical literature.
In virtually al1 of the models used, jobs are characterized by a single variable
(the wage). This implies that the optimal strategy of an unemployed individual
can be characterized by a one-dimensional reservation wage. Blau  (1991) is a
notable exception. In his model, jobs are allowed to have different wage/hours
combinations, and the optimal strategy compares utility levels associated with
different combinations. There are other relevant job characteristics that are not
taken account of in the literature. In particular, none of the studies in the liter-
ature  addresses the fact  that potential jobs differ with respect to the commuting
time  (i.e. the time  needed to travel between the present home and the location
at which the work is done). Unit commuting costs may be an important deter-
minant of behavior. If it is high, then the individual may prefer to reject an offer
of a far-away job in favor of a job around the corner even if the former job offers
a much  higher wage. In that case these costs may affect the allocation process
on the labor market. A structural analysis of a job search model allowing jobs
to have different wage/commuting-costs  combinations provides  estimates of the
effect of commuting costs  on job search behavior. This in turn helps to address
the effect of subsidizing these costs.
Recently, in The Netherlands, there has been a growing interest in inter-
actions between geographical mobility and mobility on the labor market. The
Netherlands is the third most densely populated country in the world. Most of
its population is located in the Western part of the country. During rush hours,
there is an extremely large amount of traffic congestion in this part of the country.
This has stimulated investments in infrastructure.  At the same time,  there is a
growing politica1 awareness that commuting traffic harms the environment. In
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1989 the national government fel1  over the issue of tax deductions for commuting
costs.
In order to predict  the effects of policy changes, it is essential to know how
these changes would affect individual behavior regarding acceptance and rejection
of job offers. In this paper we structurally analyze a job search model allowing
jobs to have different wage/commuting-time  combinations. It is wel1  known that
the results of structural empirical analyses of partial job search models based only
on unemployment duration data and data on characteristics of accepted  jobs, are
dependent on functional-form assumptions on the wage offer distribution (see
Flinn & Heckman (1982)). 0 ne way to deal with this is to use information from
subjective responses on aspects  of search behavior or  the environment facing the
searcher (see for example Lancaster & Chesher (1983),  Van den Berg (1990a)
and Van den Berg (1995)). H ere we use a unique dataset containing subjec-
tive responses by unemployed respondents on (i) their reservation wage for jobs
requiring virtually no commuting time,  and (ii)  their reservation wage for jobs
requiring an hour of commuting time  per home-to-work trip.’
We specify a job search model with the following distinguishing character-
istics. First, job offers are characterized by random drawings from a bivariate
distribution of wages and commuting times.  These variables are not necessarily
independent, nor are potential jobs necessarily uniformly distributed over the uni-
verse. Second,  individuals are allowed to change their residence at a certain tost
upon accepting a job offer. Third, instantaneous utility depends on income  and
on commuting time. Fourth, the model is nonstationary. In particular, the un-
employment benefits level, the job offer arrival rate  and the distribution of wages
and traveling times  are allowed to change over the duration of unemployment.
In this paper, the parameter of interest is the utility trade-off between the
wage and the commuting time,  or, in other words, the willingness to pay for com-
muting time.  (Note that “willingness to pay”  is used here in a slightly different
context than in a traditional static  model framework, since we have a dynamic
model with stochastic arrivals of opportunities. It does however  refer to a param-
eter of the instantaneous utility function.) We characterize the optimal strategy
in the model and derive the expressions for the theoretical equivalents of the
two subjective responses mentioned above. By taking the differente  of these, a
number of nuisance factors  cancel, and the parameter of interest is identified in a
--lÏn the empirical literature on job search, subjective reservation wage data have been used
both in reduced-form regressions and in structural analyses; see Devine and Kiefer (1991) and
Wolpin  (1992) for  surveys. None of the subjective reservation wage data used in the literature
distinguishes between jobs with different characteristics.
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straightforward way. We estimate this parameter for different types of individu-
als. The prime methodological contribution of the paper thus consists of showing
that responses on basic quantitative characteristics of the search strategy can be
fruitfully used to estimate structural parameters of job search models, without
the need to rely on strong functional form assumptions. In particular, in this way
one can estimate utility function parameters of search models with multiple job
characteristics.
Contrary to many  other analyses that use subjective responses on the search
process,  we pay considerable  attention to measurement errors in such responses.
In the estimation procedure we deal with different types of such errors. It is not
uncommon that part of the respondents fail to understand questions on reserva-
tion wages (see e.g. Lancaster & Chesher (1983) and Ridder & Gorter (1986)),
or do not bother  to give precise  answers. This problem may be even more promi-
nent in case such questions refer to jobs with different non-wage characteristics.
Respondents may return a zero reservation wage differente  for two types of jobs
if the real differente  is very  small, and they may round off the probability of a
very  unlikely event to zero. We adopt a specification  of the measurement error
distribution that allows  for these errors. As a result,  the empirical model has
a limited-dependent variable specification.  This empirical model bears a remote
forma1 resemblance to a disequilibrium controlled-prices  trading model with un-
observed prices  (see Maddala (1983)). We d evelop a Hausman specification  test
to test whether a qualitative categorization of responses is in accordance to quan-
titative responses within some of these categories.
As noted above, there is a growing interest in interactions between geograph-
ical mobility and job mobility in The Netherlands. References relevant for our
purposes include Rouwendal & Rietveld (1994a), who  use a cross section  of wages
and commuting distances of employed individuals to estimate some parameters
of a search model that allows for stochastic commuting distances. They assume
that the wage offered is independent of the commuting distance, and they take
parametric distributions for both variables. HCG (1990) contains a descriptive
study on subjective valuation of commuting time  in The Netherlands (this study
is summarized in Bates & Glaister (1990) and in Waters (1992)). Below we
compare  our results to those in the literature. Gorter (1994) surveys the Dutch
literature on spatial aspects  of labor market behavior. Most of the qualitative
implications of our theoretical model are in accordance to the stylized facts  in
this literature.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section  2 we present the job search
model sketched above. In Section  3 we discuss the data, and in Section  4 we
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propose a method to estimate the parameters of interest from the data at hand.
The approach is fairly general,  in the sense that it can be fruitfully applied to
estimate utility trade-offs between any two different job characteristics, provided
that appropriate subjective  responses on the optimal strategy are available. In
Section 4 we also address  identification of the parameters of the empirical model
specification. Section 5 contains the results. We also examine some implications
of the estimates, and we test the model specification, both by testing theory-based
exclusion restrictions and by applying genera1 model specification tests like the
Hausman test. Section 6 concludes.
2 The job search model with stochastic com-
mut ing t imes
2.1 The genera1 model
Job search theory tries to describe the behavior of unemployed individuals in
a dynamic  and uncertain environment. In this section  we develop a job search
model that takes account of positive commuting times  associated with potential
jobs, and that allows these times  to be dispersed over potential jobs. The model
is nonstationary and in continuous time.  It can be regarded as a generalization
of the nonstationary job search model as developed by Van den Berg (1990a).
Because of that, we avoid technicalities.
Job offers arrive at random intervals following a possibly non-homogeneous
Poisson process with arrival rate  x(t), in which t denotes the elapsed duration of
unemployment. A job offer at time  t is a random drawing (without recall) from
the joint distribution of net wages zu and commuting times  h,  with distribution
function F(w,  hit). S everal comments are in order. First of all, we take the wage
to be net of pecuniary commuting costs  and possible refunds for these costs  by
the employer, so that the value of h does not reflect pecuniary aspects  of the job
offer. Later on we return to this issue. Secondly, in line with the theoretical and
empirical literature on search theory, we assume that al1 jobs are full-time jobs.
Thirdly, we allow commuting times  to be non-uniformly distributed over space.
For example, for an individual living in a village,  most job offers may originate
from a nearby larger town, so they wil1  have approximately the same commuting
time.  Finally, we allow the wage offers to be dependent on the associated com-
muting times. This is just for reasons of generality. For example, one may live
close to a few smal1 firms offering low wages and far from a large firm offering a
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higher wage.
Every  time  an offer arrives, the decision has to be made whether to accept
the offer or  reject it and search further. Initially,  we assume that once  a job is
accepted  it wil1  be kept forever at the same wage. This means  that we exclude
job-to-job transitions. Later on we wil1  examine the consequences of relaxing
this assumption. Upon accepting a job offer, the individual has the possibility
of changing his residence at a fixed tost  c, in order to reduce  commuting time  to
zero. In that case the individual borrows the amount of c, and returns the money
flow pc to the bank for the rest of his life. (The exact terms of the mortgage  are
inessential for the remainder.) During the spel1 of unemployment, unemployment
benefits b(t) are received.
Nonstationarity arises if b(t), x(t)  or  F(w,  h(t) change as a function of t.  Such
changes may be due to business cycle effects, policy changes, institutional  features
of the environment facing the searcher, or  stigma effects. We assume that job
searchers have perfect foresight in the sense that they correctly anticipate  changes
in the values of these functions of t.  Individuals do not know in advance  when
job offers arrive, or  which w and h are associated with them.
Unemployed individuals aim at maximization of their own expected present
value of utility over an infinite horizon. We assume that utility is intertemporally
separable. The instantaneous utility function equals u(2u,  h)  in case one works at
a wage w and commuting time  is equal to h,  whereas it equals v.u(b, 0) in case one
is unemployed and benefits are equal to b. We assume that u strictly increases
(strictly decreases) in its first (second) argument. The parameter v represents the
non-pecuniary component of instantaneous utility in unemployment relative to
employment. Empirical studies on other data sets have found this to be smaller
than one (see e.g. Van den Berg (1990a) and Van den Berg (1990b) and references
t herein).
Let p be the rate  of discount, and let R(t) d enote the expected present value
of search if unemployment duration equals t,  when  following the optimal strategy.
Analogous to Van den Berg (1990a)  it can be shown that, under regularity con-
ditions, there is a unique continuous solution to the Bellman equation for R(t).
This equation then implies the following differential equation for R(t) at points
at which R(t) is differentiable in t,
PW = W)T+v-u@(t), O)+~(t)JL,~pax(o, 4% h)P -R(t),
u(w p,‘? ‘> -R(t))
(1)
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In this equation, the expectation is taken over the distribution with c.d.f.
F(w,hlt).  Equation (1) has a familiar structure.  The return of the asset R(t)
in a smal1 interval around t equals the sum of the appreciation of the asset in
this interval, the instantaneous utility flow in this interval, and the expected
excess value of finding a job in this interval. When  an offer of w,  h arrives at t
then there are three options: (i) to reject it (excess value zero), (ii) to accept
it and spend commuting time  h in the future (excess value U(W,  h)/p - R(t)),
and (iii)  to accept it and move to a residence at the location of the job (excess
value u(w - pc,O)/p -  R(t)). It is clear that the optimal policy is to choose
option (ii)  if U(U),  h)  > pR(t)  and U(U),  h) > u(w - pc, 0), to choose option (iii)  if
U(ZO  - pc, 0) > pR(t)  and U(W,  h)  < u( w - pc,  0), and to choose option (i) in al1
ot her cases.
Figure 1 depicts the areas associated with each choice for a typical case. The
optimal strategy can be characterized by three reservation wage type functions,
as follows. First, suppose one cannot change residence. Then a job offer of w,  h
at t is acceptable  if and only if ZU exceeds the reservation wage for offers at t  of
jobs with h hours of commuting time.  This reservation wage is denoted by ~$(hlt)
and is implicitly defined by
Now suppose changing residence is allowed. Then, upon acceptance of an offer of
w,h  using the criterion ~$(hlt),  the individual decides to change residence if and
only if h exceeds the “moving threshold” commuting time  for jobs with wage w.
The moving threshold is denoted by t(20) and is implicitly defined by
+h W) = utw  - PC,  0) (3)
Note that [(ZU) d oes not depend on the unemployment duration t .
Finally, some jobs are acceptable  if changing residence is possible, while they
are unacceptable if changing residence is not possible. In that case w,  h fails to
satisfy 20  2 d(hlt),  while it does satisfy w > c(t),  with c(t)  implicitly defined by
a(t)  -  PC7  0) = PW
Note that c(t) d oes  not depend on h.
(4)
From equations (2) and (3) one can derive simple comparative  statics,  like
%w>
i?h
> 0  a n d  -w4  > 0
dc * (5)
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Other comparative  exercises can be carried out analogous to Van den Berg
(19904.
For the sequel it is important to note that the values of the function ~$(hlt)
depend on the values of al1 the deep structural parameters and functions X,  F,  b,  c,
U,  21 and p.
2.2 Reservation wage differences
As stated in the introduction, the data provide information on the reservation
wages given two possible realizations of commuting time.  In particular, the data
provide subjective  responses on 4(  1 It)  and 4(Olt), with commuting time  measured
in hours, and with t denoting the elapsed unemployment duration of the respon-
dent. We therefore now examine $(hlt) more closely in the theoretical model.
Note that 4(hlt) is sensibly defined even if h is so large that it is always optimal
to change residence upon accepting a job. In the latter  case the value of +(hlt)  is
irrelevant for actual behavior, but it does correctly describe the optimal strategy
in case a zero-probability offer comes along of a job on commuting time  h for
which changing residence is forbidden.
Let ui and u2 denote the partial derivatives of u with respect to their first
and second argument, respectively. By differentiating equation (2) with respect
to h we obtain
(6)
Somewhat informally, this states that if h increases then the increase of the
reservation wage is such that at the new reservation wage the decrease in utility
due to the increase of h is exactly offset. Note that minus the right-hand side
of equation (6) d e f ines the (negative) marginal willingness to pay for commuting
time  h when the reservation wage equals $(hJt). From the equation it is clear
that information on the behavior of qS(hlt) as a function of h allows identification
of u&.+
From equation (2) it follows that for al1 t  and al1 h there holds  that
4?Kw),  h) = +?wl%  0) (7)
We now make the assumption that preferences are additive in w and h, i.e. that
there are functions k, g and U such that for every  w,  h there holds  that
+, h) = u (kW  + 9 (W (8)
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By substituting this into equation (7) it follows that
(9)
The right-hand side  of this equation can be interpreted as an indicator of the
ceteris parib~s  differente  in utility for commuting time  0 and commuting time  h.
Several comments are in order. First, note that the only way in which t enters
this equation is as an argument of the reservation wage function. Given values
of 4(V)  ad 4(W>, nothing in the equation changes with t. Secondly, the latter
is also true for the structural parameters other than the utility function. Given
values of qS(hlt) and $(Olt), nothing in the equation changes with X,  F,  b,  c, v or  p.
These properties are of importante  for the empirical implementation below.
Note that in the special case in which both I C  and g are linear, equation (9)
specifies  4(hlt) - cj(Olt) as a linear function of h. Consequently, in that case the
utility function u can be completely identified (up to a monotone transformation)
from information on +(llt)  -  $(Olt).
It may be clear from the derivation above that the form of equation (9) is ro-
bust with respect to numerous generalizations c.q. misspecifications of the model.
Basically, this equation follows from a comparison of the lifetime utilities of jobs
with different commuting times. Since the search technology in unemployment
and the instantaneous utility of unemployment do not affect the lifetime utility of
a job, the part of the model describing the former can be generalized substantially
at no tost  .
On the other hand, if employed individuals search optimally to obtain better
jobs, then the lifetime utility of a job with given W,  h depends on the parameters
of the search technology in employment. It can be shown that then these pa-
rameters directly enter the equivalent of equation (7) (that is, in addition to the
effect they have on 4(hlt)  and d(Olt)). This is also true for the right-hand side
of the equivalent of equation (9). So , if the job offer arrival rates  in employment
and unemployment are the same, then the right-hand side  of the equivalent of
(9) depends on X.  Similarly, if preferences do not satisfy equation (8) then the
right-hand side  of the equivalent of equation (9) (which would be some kind of
differente  of 4(llt)  and qS(Olt)) includes al1 structural parameters of the model.
An empirical analysis in the context of these extended models would require the
joint estimation of al1  the structural parameters. (Note that the extension in
which employed individuals are allowed to search is fundamentally more complex
than the model we developed, since the reservation wage of an employed individ-
ual depends on (i)  his present wage and (i;)  commuting time,  and on (;;i)  the
commuting time  associated with the offer at hand.) Nevertheless, the results of
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this paragraph suggest that our model specification  can be tested by examining
whether the right-hand side  of the reservation wage differente  equation (9) de-
pends on observable variables representing structural determinants of the model
(like b and X). In such a case it should be clear a priori that such variables do
not affect the true utility function.
A similar result  follows by extending the model to allow for habit  formation.
Suppose that the willingness to pay for commuting time  g(h) depends on un-
employment duration t. Then the right-hand side  of equation (9) depends on
t (under the condition  that the optimal strategy stil1 has the reservation wage
property). This can be tested, taking into account that t is an endogenous vari-
able.
In Section 4 we discuss the empirical implementation of the model developed
in this section.  As noted in the introduction, we pay substantial attention to the
modeling of different types of measurement errors in the data. We therefore first
describe the data we use, in Section 3.
3 The data set
For the empirical analysis, we use data from the OSA (Netherlands Organization
for Strategie  Labour Market Research) Labor Supply  Panel Survey. In this survey,
a random sample of households in The Netherlands is followed over time.  The
study concentrates  on individuals who  are between 15 and 61 years of age, and
who  are not full-time students. Therefore only households with at least one
person in this category are included. Al1  individuals (and in al1 cases the head
of the household) in this category are interviewed. The first wave  consists of
4020 individuals (in 2132 households), and has been collected  in April 1985. The
length of the time  interval between two consecutive  interviews is generally about
two years.
At the first interview, respondents were asked to recall their labor market
history from January, 1980 until the date of the interview. They were also asked
to provide information on their income  at the date of the interview. In addition,
a number of time-constant individual characteristics is recorded.
The data set contains unique quantitative information on the strategy used
by unemployed job searchers. At the first interview, individuals who  were unem-
ployed at the date of that interview were asked for their lowest acceptable  net
wage offer. Responses on this question are interpreted as the observed counterpart
of the reservation wage 4(Olt), in which t is the elapsed duration of unemployment
at the first interview. Immediately after this question, the respondent is asked
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for his lowest acceptable net wage offer if the time needed to truvel from  home to
the work location as wel1 as the time needed for the reverse  route would be one
hour, and if al1  pecuniary commuting costs would be reimbursed by the employer.
Responses on the latter  question are interpreted as the observed counterpart of
the reservation wage 4(llt). These questions were not repeated at subsequent
interviews. In the sequel, we use $(hlt)  (h = 0,l)  to denote the answer to the
question on d(hlt).
One might argue that the first question can also be interpreted as referring
to the mean  reservation wage E,(d(hlt)) over al1 commuting times,  rather  than
to q5(Olt). H owever,  the question refers to the lowest acceptable offer, and the
lowest possible acceptable wage offer is d(Olt),  since q5(hlt)  increases in h. More-
over, it may be reasonable to assume that for most unemployed individuals the
“standard” job is a job around the corner. (Note that this may not be true for
employed individuals.)
For our analysis, we have selected individuals who  reported to be unemployed
and searching for a job in the first wave  of the survey (272 cases). After  eliminat-
ing observations with missing information, a sample of 238 individuals remains.
When  answering the question on 4(llt),  the respondent has the option of
stating that at the time  of the interview he would never accept a job with the
characteristics described in the question. In that case, the respondent states that
u(w,  1) < pR(t)  for al1 w in the support of F(w,  llt) (see equation (2)). This wil1
happen when commuting costs are extremely high. In any case, we can denote
this by &llt)  = 00.
Consequently, we can distinguish between three types of answers. Given an
answer &Olt),  the respondent supplies either $(llt)  = &Olt),  or &Olt)  # &llt)  < CO,
or $(llt)  = 00. We denote these as Cases 1, 11 and 111, respectively. According
to Table 1, they hold for 54%,  31% and 15% of the respondents, respectively.
For those in the second group, the average  differente  between $(llt)  and $(Olt)
equals about US $ 130 per month. Figure 2 summarizes the sample distribution
of &llt) - &Olt)  for the second group. We postpone a discussion of the empirical
model specification  for the Cases 1 and 111 until the next section.
We use information from the first interview on personal characteristics (like
gender and age) and household characteristics (married or living together, num-
ber of children at home). We also  include variables reflecting differences in the
regional environment. First, an indicator is created to measure the condition  of
the regional labor market for each individual in the sample. For this purpose,
the OSA labor market survey was extended with data on unemployment rates  in
regional-occupational labor market segments. We distinguish between 40 regions.
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For each of these regions, unemployment rates  have been calculated for groups
defined by occupation (we distinguish between 46 types), age (5 categories)  and
gender. Secondly, we use the degree of urbanization to control for behavioral
differences of individuals in urban and peripheral areas. Table 1 contains an
overview of variables and their sample means.
4 The empirical implementation
4.1 A basic  empirical specification
In this section we discuss how  to use equation (9) in conjunction with the data
discussed in the previous section, to estimate the parameter of interest. First of
all, we assume for the moment that the function k is linear,
k(w) = k, + k,w (10)
This assumption wil1  be relaxed later on. By substituting (10) into equation (9)
it follows that
4(1(t)  -  4(0lt)  = g(O);  g(1)
1
(11)
The right-hand side  of this equation can be interpreted as the pecuniary equiv-
alent of the ceteris  paribus differente  in utility between commuting time  0 and
commuting time  h = 1. In other words, it is minus the (negative) willingness to
pay for commuting time  h = 1. Note that k, (including al1 the variables that
only affect the leveZ  of the reservation wage as a function of h) has canceled from
this equation. Because the right-hand side  of equation (9) does not depend on t,
we wil1  suppress the dependence  of $(hJt)  on t in the notation below.
The empirical implementation has to deal with at least three different issues.
First, it has to deal with the way in which the model specification is allowed to
vary over observed explanatory variables, and with the role of omitted explana-
tory variables and related specification errors. Secondly, it has to deal with the
modeling of the three cases we distinguished concerning the response to the ques-
tions on 4(l) and 4(O).  Thirdly, it has to deal with possible measurement errors
in the case in which the respondent supplies answers B(O)  # q(l) < 00.
Consider the first issue. For obvious reasons, it is likely that (g(0) -  g(l))/k,
differs among different types of individuals. Let x denote the observed explana-
tory variables. We make the following parameterization,
12
40) -dl) = Jp + e
kl
(12)
with E(e) = 0 and e I z. We take e to be i.i.d. Normal(0,  az) across individ-
uals.  The variable e is assumed to Capture the effects of unobserved (omitted)
explanatory variables on (g(0) -  g(l))/k,,  i.e. it is a specification  error.
In Section 3 we observed that a positive fraction of the respondents give
exactly the same answer to the question on 4(l)  as to the question on 4(O).
Probably, respondents do not bother  to give a different answer if the differente  in
values is very  small. Such  observations then provide information on the parameter
of interest. The data seem to confirm this in the sense that the proportion of
respondents in Case 1 is smaller for groups of individuals for which we a priori
expect  a larger disutility of commuting (e.g. females). Also,  note from Figure 2
that the sample distribution of the observed differente  of d(l)  and 4(O)  is heavily
skewed to the right and that the left-hand tail ends  rather  abruptly at about Dfl
50 per month. (Later on we formally test whether this interpretation of Case 1
responses is correct.) We assume that
J(l) = iJ(O) @ d(l) - W)  < Co (13)
In Section 3 we also  observed that a positive fraction of the respondents
basically states that the value of 4(l) is so large that a transition to a job with
commuting time  h = 1 is precluded (Case 111). Probably respondents, when  giving
such an answer, ignore the highly unlikely event of an arrival of an extremely
large wage offer that would induce  them to accept the corresponding commuting
time  h = 1. Again, such observations provide  information on the parameters of
interest, and the data confirm this in the same sense as in the previous paragraph.
We therefore take
J(1)  = 00 * 4(l)  - 4(O)  > Cl (14)
In the light of the fact  that this group of respondents consists only of 36 in-
dividuals, we do not attempt  to estimate a more sophisticated model for this
case.
At this stage it is instructive  to examine the model without measurement
errors in the Case 11 answers J(l)  -  J(O) ( i.e., when  these satisfy J(1)  - J(O)  =
b(l)  - d(O)). In this case
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B(O)  # m < cxl ti co  < b(l)  -  4(O)  < cl and
(15)
J(1)  -  J(O) = zc’/?  + e
Suppose one were to estimate this model. This model can be called a two-
limit Tobit model with quantitative observations for the middle group and with
unknown threshold values. The unknown parameters are /3,  ge,co and ci.  The
likelihood contains the restrictions that for al1 individuals in Case 11 there holds
that
Co  < J(1)  - &O)  < Cl (16)
Denote the numbers of respondents in Cases 1, 11 and 111 by n1,n2  and n3,
respectively. Apart from the restrictions in equation (16),  the log likelihood is
as follows (with XP denoting the cumulative  distribution function of the Standard
Normal  distribution):
1ogL = Clog9nl (“--L”)  +ClogQ  (“‘“or”)  +
-n3  log 0, - & c (au,  -  J(O) -  x7g2
e w2
(17)
The first term on the right-hand side  is based  on the probability that the event
described in equation (13) occurs, using equations (11) and (12) and using the
normal  distribution of e. Similarly, the second  term is based on the probability
that the event described in equation (14) occurs. The last terms are based on
product of (i)  the probability that the event described in equation (15) occurs
and (ii)  the density of d(l)  -  J(O) conditional on the event described in equation
(15).
The expression on the right-hand side  of equation (17) is increasing in co  and
decreasing in ci. This means  that the maximum likelihood estimates of these
parameters are determined by the inequality restrictions (16). Specifically, the
estimate of co  (ci)  equals the smallest  (largest) observed J(l)  -  J(O) among Case
11 respondents. Thus, the likelihood is discontinuous and the ML estimators
have non-standard properties. (There is an analogy to the estimation of job
search models in case the reservation wage is estimated as the smallest  observed
accepted  wage offer (see Flinn & Heckman (1982)). Basically, the ML estimates
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of c,,  and ci can be considered as being exactly correct when  estimating the
other parameters by ML.) It is clear that such estimates are extremely sensitive
to measurement errors in the J(h)  data. For example, if only one respondent
erroneously supplies a value of J(l) w ic is extremely large, and larger thanh’ h
his true 4(l), then the estimate of ci wil1  be substantially biased in an upward
direction, and this wil1  affect the other estimates.
This suggests that it is necessary to account for measurement errors in the
model specification. There is actually another way to argue that the specification
of the model above is restrictive. Note that the model can be thought of as
consisting of two stages: (1) an ordered probit  stage describing the allocation of
respondents over the Cases 1,II  and 111, and (2) a regression stage describing the
quantitative values of the endogenous variable of the respondents in Case 11. The
model states that the stochastic variation governing the first stage is the same as
the stochastic variation governing the second stage: the only source of variation
consists of specification errors. Clearly, this is restrictive. We wil1  now present
two model extensions that deal with this. The first one wil1  turn out to be the
empirically superior one.
4.2 More sophisticated empirical specifications
The first extension of the basic specification of the previous subsection concerns
the inclusion of measurement errors in the values of J(l)  -  J(O) of the Case 11
respondents. First of all, note that any systematic  measurement error, equally
affecting the supplied values of 4(l)  and 4(O)  of a Case 11 respondent, cancels
from the equation for $(  1) -  J(O). N ow suppose that there are measurement
errors v in the values of J(1)  -  J(O)  supplied by Case 11 respondents, in the
following way,
J(1)  -  J(O) = 4(l)  -  4(O)  + u (18)
These may be due to calculation errors. They do not cancel e.g. if on average the
error made in calculating d(l) exceeds the error made in calculating d(O),  which
is plausible. As a consequente,  equation (15) is replaced by
i@)  # m < OQ M co  < 4(  1) -  4(O)  < cl and
(19)
ij(l) - s(O)  = x'p  + e + 2,
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in which $(  1) -4(O)  is stil1 described by equations (11) and (12). We assume that
E(v)  = 0 and e I v I 2. We take v to be i.i.d. Normal(0,  ai) across individuals.
In this model, the unknown parameters are P,cre,a,,,cO and ci.  Now there
are no inequality restrictions for the unknown parameters in terms of the data
(like (16)). T his is basically because for any Case 11 respondent there are positive
probabilities on J(  1) - J(O) < cc, and on J(  1) -  J(O) > ci.
To derive the likelihood contributions of respondents in Case 11, it is necessary
to derive the density w of J(1)  -  Q(O) conditional on being in Case 11, that is the
density of x’/3  + e + TJ  conditional on cg  -  x’/? < e < ci - x’@  (and conditional on
IC).  By applying results in Pudney (1989) we obtain (with $J  denoting the p.d.f.
of the Standard Normal  distribution):
If aY = 0 then the numerator of the ratio forming the last part of equation
(20) reduces to the indicator function of the event described by (16),  so then
the density above reduces to the doubly truncated Normal  density for the basic
specification  of the previous paragraph. For cV  > 0 the density above has thinner
tails than Normal  densities. Note that if & 1) -  T(O)  gets very  large or  very  small,
then the ratio forming the last part of equation (20) goes  to zero. In sum, the
density described by equation (20) is a sort of average  between a Normal  density
and a doubly truncated Normal  density.
By invoking equation (20) it can be shown that the log likelihood equals
1ogL = clogQ(cO-
n1
~x’~)+~logl(x’~~-C’)+
e n3 e
-2  log@,2  + 0:)  -  2(a,2:  a,2)  * c (J(1)  -  J(O) -  xY?>”  +
m
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This is a well-behaved likelihood function; therefore the ML estimators have stan-
dard properties. Like the basic model specification of the previous subsection,
the present model can be thought of as consisting of two stages: (1) an ordered
probit  stage describing the allocation over Cases 1, 11 and 111, and (2) a regres-
sion stage for the endogenous variable in Case 11. The present model states that
the stochastic variation governing the second stage is larger than the stochastic
variation governing the first stage. The additional variation in the second stage
consists of measurement errors  in the endogenous variable in Case 11.’  3
We now present a second model extension. It may be that in reality the
variation in the second stage is smaller (rather  than larger) than the variation in
the first stage. The following model extension generates this prediction. Consider
again the basic  specification of the previous subsection, and suppose that the
specification of the threshold values co and cr is incorrect in the sense that in
reality these values are not the same for every  individual. The latter  is plausible
as some individuals may put more efforts in quantifying a value of d(l)  close
‘It  should be noted that the model extension above bears a forma1 resemblance to a dis-
equilibrium trading model with controlled  prices  (see Maddala (1983) for a brief survey of
applications of disequilibrium models). Consider a model in which there is only trade if the
equilibrium price  P at which supply and demand  meet lies between lower and upper  threshold
values PI and Pz. Suppose that we only observe whether P is larger or smaller than these
values, and that in addition we observe the traded quantity Q if positive (which is only the
case if PI < P < Px).  This model can be translated to our model if we interpret PI and P-J  as
- -cc and cl, P as ti(l)  - 4(O), and Q as 4(l) - #J(O).  In addition, some exclusion restrictions in
the demand  and supply functions are necessary. To our knowledge, such models have not been
estimated.
3The  empirical implementation of our model is remotely related to the methodology de-
veloped by Cameron (1988) fo r analyzing subjective  responses on the acceptance or rejection
of prices  for a certain leisure activity. In her setup,  respondents are confronted with (ran-
domly assigned) given prices, whereas we basically ask for the threshold price.  Cameron &
James (1987) contains an empirical analysis. Our empirical model can be formally reduced
to Cameron’s model by taking CO = cl and by taking this to be the observed offered price.
Note that in that case there is no equivalent of Case 11. This, as wel1  as the fact  that for each
respondent a threshold value is observed, simplifies the empirical specification considerably.
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to 4(O)  than others, and some individuals may have more trouble quantifying a
very  large value of d(  1). For simplicity, we assume for the moment that there is
a single random variable describing the variation in both cc, and ci,  and that this
variable is orthogonal to e. In particular,
cg = yo + u
(22)
Cl = Yl + u
We take u to be i.i.d. Normal(O,ai) across individuals. In this model, the
unknown parameters are ,8,  Q,,  u,,  y,,  and yi.  Again, there are no inequality
restrictions like (16) for  unknown parameters in terms of data. This is basically
because now for any observation & 1) -  q(O) there is a positive probability that
J(  1) -  J(O)  lies between c,,  and ci .
The likelihood function for this specification can be derived analogous to
above.
(23)
-n2  log cre - & * c (J(l)  -  &O)  -  a>,  +
e 712
+Clog  *[ (
71 - J(l) + J(O)
) (
_ * Yo - m - i%O)
“2 0, QiL )l
Again, this likelihood function is well-behaved and the ML estimators have
standard properties. Note that it is therefore not necessary to include measure-
ment errors into the model in order to get a standard estimable specification.
The present model version states that the stochastic variation governing the
ordered probit  stage of the model is larger than the stochastic variation governing
the “regression” stage. The additional variation in the first stage consists of
specification errors in the boundaries of the probit  categories. This variation
does not affect the values of the endogenous variable in the second stage for Case
11 respondents.
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When  estimating the latter  model version, the estimate of az invariably went
to zero. This means  that the variation in the first stage is smaller than in the
second stage. We therefore did not pursue analyses of more elaborate model
extensions along this line.
Clearly, one may think of yet other ways to link the data to the model.
For example, one may adopt a specification of the utility function such that
individuals are completely indifferent between values of h within the sets [0, h,]
and [h*, 00)  (in the latter  case, utility is minus infinity). Then Case 1 and Case 111
answers can be interpreted as evidente  that 1 < h, and 1 > h*,  respectively. In
such models, Case 1 and 111 respondents do not round off their answers. However,
it can be shown that the resulting empirical models are similar to the models we
estimate. Another type of models follows from assuming that Case 1 and 111
respondents have not understood the question on d(l)  at all. We return to this
in the next subsection.
4.3 Identification
As noted above, the model version allowing for measurement errors  v in the Case
11 responses is the preferred empirical specification. In this subsection we examine
the identifiability of this model, and we propose some specification tests.
So consider the model defined by equations (ll),  (12),  (13),  (14) and (19) and
by the corresponding distributional assumptions. Because of the smal1 number of
observations we do not attempt  to generalize this model any further. For ease of
exposition we redefine  z such that x’@ can be rewritten as & + x’pi,  in which the
latter  x does not contain a constant. Thus, the parameters are &,/3i,co,  ci,  ae
and 0,.
The ordered probit  on the Case 1, 11 and 111 categories  allows identification
of (co  - Po)/a,,  (ci  - Po)/ae  and ,8i/~~.  The mean of &l)  -  J(O)  conditional on
being in Case 11 (and conditional on x) equals
E(&l)  -  &O)lco < &, + z’&  + c < cl)
(24)
This means  that a “second stage” regression on these data allows identification
of the parameters ,f30  and ,8i  of the unconditional mean  of 4(l)  -  4(O), and of
ae.  By implication, co  and ci are identified. The remaining parameter gV  is then
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identified from the variante  of the “second  stage” regression. If /3i  = 0 then
higher moments are needed for identification.
This identification argument is not crucially dependent on the assumed func-
tional form of the error distributions (i.e. on Normality), in the sense that it also
holds for other distributions for which the mean  is zero and the only unknown
parameter is a scale  parameter. However,  it is clear that the estimates of ,f$,  and
ae  are not robust with respect to the assumption of symmetrically distributed
specification errors. Because of this the results are not suitable for predicting
individual levels of d(  1) -  4(O).
Intuitively, it is likely that the estimates of c,,  and ci wil1  be affected by the
shape of the empirical density of T(1)  - s(O) among Case 11 respondents, in the
sense that these estimates wil1  be close to the points at which the density sharply
increases and decreases, respectively. The size of the tails outside these points
wil1  affect the estimate of oV.  This estimate wil1  also  be affected by the amount
of heaping in the Case 11 reservation wage differente  data.
We distinguish between two types of specification tests in our application.
The first type tests whether the theory leading to equation (11) is correct. We
use the theoretical framework of Section  2 to generate  exclusion restrictions on
the variables included in z. This idea has been discussed in Subsection 2.2.
For example, we wil1  use the respondent’s unemployment benefits leve1 b as an
additional regressor. If the corresponding coefficient is significant then this is
interpreted as evidente  that the theoretical model is incorrect, in the sense that
on-the-job search is an important determinant of search behavior of unemployed
individuals, or in the sense that instantaneous utility is not additive in zu and h.
Secondly, we test the specification of the empirical limited-dependent variable
model (see equation (21)). In addition to straightforward goodness of fit tests we
wil1  also carry out Hausman tests (see Godfrey (1991) for a survey on Hausman
tests). As noted above, the parameters (cg  -  &)/oe,  (ci -  &)/a,  and @,/a,  can
be estimated by an ordered probit  analysis on the Case 1, 11 and 111 categories.
These parameters can also be estimated by performing ML on the whole  data set.
If the model is correct then these estimates should not be significantly different.
Now suppose that the p,  / ae  estimates are significantly different. Then this is
evidente  that the quantitative responses in the Case 11 group are governed by a
different behavior than the qualitative self-classifications of the respondents over
the three cases. This may occur if an answer J(l)  -  J(O)  does not mean  that the
true differente  4(l)  -  4(O) is very  small, but rather  means that the respondent
has not understood the question on d(l)  at all. It is less clear what it means  if
the estimates of (cs -  &)/a,  and (ci -  ,&)/a,  are different. Intuitively, this may
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indicate that the distribution of e is misspecified.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates for the analysis based on the whole
dataset. The observed explanatory variables z are classified into categories de-
scribing personal characteristics, household characteristics and characteristics of
the environment, respectively. We first discuss the results for p in the first column
of Table 2.
In the part of ,B  corresponding to the first two categories, the only significant
element is the element associated with the number of children for females. (A
similar variable for males  turned out to be completely insignificant.) The larger
the number of children, the lower the willingness of females to pay for for com-
muting time.  An additional child implies that the willingness to pay for two hours
of commuting time  per day is about Dfl 140 per month lower (this is about US $
80).  Apparently, the value of leisure is relatively large for females with children.
Another explanation is that the pecuniary tost  of child care is increasing with
(i)  the number of hours in which such facilities are used, and (G)  the number
of children, and that females are more concerned with this. Finally, a working
woman having  children may want to work close’ to the child care location in order
to be able to move quickly to that location in case of an emergency, and also
perhaps in order to be able to have lunch with the children.
Note that the value of d(l)  - d(O) for a woman having a couple of children
can be very large. For example, a woman having three children has a value
of 4(l)  - 4(O) tha ceteris paribus is about Dfl 500 per month higher than thet
corresponding value for a male. For most occupations this would mean that,
given any plausible value of d(O),  the value of d(l)  exceeds the maximum possible
offered wage (this is even more so if the baseline  reservation wage 4(O)  for females
is larger than for males.)  In other words, such females would restrict job search
to jobs located within a very  smal1 distance. The disutility of commuting time
can therefore be identified as a(nother) factor having a negative impact on the
labor market performance of females.
The regional unemployment rate  does not have a significant “effect” on the
willingness to pay for commuting time. Note that if it were significant then
this might indicate a misspecification of the model. In unemployment duration
analyses, the regional unemployment rate  is often used as an explanatory variable
indicating labor market tightness, i.e. as a proxy for the job offer arrival rate  X
(see Section  2). As argued in Subsections 2.2 and 4.3, if the job offer arrival rate
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is significant in the parameter ,B  of the utility function then this suggests that
the theoretical model is incorrect.
The degree of urbanization does have a significant “effect” on the willingness
to pay for commuting time. Ceteris  paribus,  an individual living in a large city
(degree of urbanization = 13) is willing to pay about Dfl 290 per month more for
two hours of commuting per day than an individual in a very  rural area (degree
of urbanization = 3). One explanation for this is that commuting trips in highly
urbanized areas are often multi-purpose trips, in the sense that traveling to work
can easily be combined  with traveling to friends, shops, child-care  centers, leisure
activity centers and so on.
Other explanations are based on the observation that commuting trips usually
take place  during rush hours. In highly urbanized areas there wil1  often be traffic
congestion during rush hours, implying that the distance reached in a given time
period is smaller during rush hours than at other times  of the day. So, even when
it takes one hour to reach a given work location during rush hours, it wil1  take
less time  to travel  from home to work during e.g. lunch hours. This phenomenon
wil1  not occur in rural areas. This gives jobs on a one hour commuting distance in
urbanized areas an advantage over similar jobs in rural areas. Finally, there may
be a self-selection effect in the sense that individuals with a strong dislike of being
in unknown places  and being among unknown people may be over-represented
in rural areas. Note that there may also  be a self-selection effect working in the
other direction: individuals who  dislike commuting may choose to live close to
where most jobs are, i.e. in highly urbanized areas. The latter  is not supported
by our result.  To overcome these endogeneity problems, data with much  longer
labor market histories as wel1  as locational choice histories may be needed.
The other coefficients in /3 are insignificant (note that the sample size is quite
small). Since there is no established literature on the effects of personal charac-
teristics on the disutility of commuting time,  some specification  search over such
characteristics seems justified. 4 We performed additional analyses to investigate
4Rouwendal  & Rietveld (1994a) specify a search model for unemployed individuals in which
jobs are characterized by a wage and a commuting distance, and in which wage offers are as-
sumed to be independent from the associated commuting distances. They use a cross section of
realized wages and commuting distances of employed individuals in order to estimate parame-
ters of the offer distribution and the pecuniary costs  of commuting per distance measure. The
values of the other parameters (like X,p and b) are fixed numerically prior to the estimation
procedure. They estimate models for four parts of the country, and they find that the disutility
of commuting a kilometer is slightly larger for the most densely populated part. This not in
conflict with our results on the “effect” of the degree of urbanization, since the time  needed to
travel one kilometer is larger in more urbanized areas.
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the “effect&’ of nationality and years of work experience, and we allowed for non-
linearities in the education variable. We also investigated whether a preferente for
temporary jobs has any “effect”. It turns out that al1 personal characteristics are
invariably insignificant. Because of this, we also present in Table 2 the estimates
for the model in which al1 personal characteristics are excluded as explanatory
variables. The other estimates are highly insensitive to this exclusion.
The results for c,, and c1 are very  plausible. When the differente between 4(l)
and 4(O)  is less than Df157 per month then individuals do not bother to quantify
d(1). About 54% of th e sample consists of Case 1 respondents, so the estimated
population median of 4(l) - d(O) is smaller than Dfl 57 per month. This finding
is robust with respect to the assumed distribution of e.
When the differente between 4(l) and d(O) exceeds Dfl 525 per month then
respondents simply state that they would never accept a job with h = 1 at the
date of the interview. Note that by estimating cr we have in effect quantified the
expression “never”, albeit only in this specific context. The model predicts that
if the respondents who give such an answer are offered a job with h = 1 and a
monthly wage exceeding their reservation wage for jobs around the corner by say
Dfl 600, that then some of them would then accept this job.
The estimated standard deviation cre of the specification  error is substantial.
The pseudo-R2 for the equation 4( 1) - d(O) = z’B + e equals 0.53. The standard
deviation a,, of the measurement error is significantly positive, but small. This
is plausible, given that there are almost no data points either far below cc, or far
above cr, and given that is some heaping in the J(1) - J(O)  data. In any case,
this result justifies the approach followed in Subsection 4.2.
We also estimated a model in which IC(w)  in the utility function (see equation
(8)) is linear in log w rather  than in 20.  In that case, equations (11) and (12) are
replaced by log d(llt)-log $(Olt)  = (g(O)-g(l))/-,  = s’P+e. We redefine  Cases
1-111 by replacing 4(h) by log d(h) in the appropriate equations in Section 4. The
resulting estimate of B reflects proportionate “effects”  of 2 on the willingness to
pay for commuting time. It turns out that this model fits the data almost equally
wel1 and that the estimation results do not provide new insights. This also holds
Rouwendal &  Rietveld (19946) estimate a parameterized reduced-form model for the distri-
bution of commuting distances of employed individuals, using the same data as in their paper
mentioned above. They find that (ceteris paribus)  individuals with children and older individu-
als have significantly smaller commuting distances. The former is consistent with our findings.
HCG (1990) contains a descriptive  study of subjective  valuations of commuting time  in the
whole  population (see also  Bates & Glaister (1990) and Waters (1992)). They also  conclude
that the disutility of commuting time  is relatively large for individuals with children and for
younger individuals.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have used subjective  responses on the optimal search strategy
of unemployed individuals to estimate structural parameters. These responses
concern the reservation wage for jobs around the corner and the reservation wage
for jobs on a one-hour commuting distance. The structural parameters we esti-
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for other alternative additive utility function specifications we tried.
Finally, we estimated the model of Section  4 using the likelihood function
(17),  taking account of (16). In this case, cc, and ci are estimated to be Dfl 50
and Dfl 542, respectively, which are the smallest  and largest observed & 1) -  J(O)
among Case 11 respondents. These estimates do not differ much  from those in
Table 2, which is not surprising given the (small) magnitude of the cV  estimate
in Table 2. However,  some of the ,Bi  estimates do differ. Notably, the gender
coefficient  goes  from 0.78 to -0.81 while the “degree of urbanization” coefficient
goes  from -0.28 to -0.15 (it remains significant).
We now turn to the additional specification  tests proposed in Subsection 4.3.
First of all, we re-estimated the model with the unemployment benefits leve1 b
included in 2,  using a number of different ways to measure b. The corresponding
coefficient  invariably turned out to be insignificant, which supports our  structural
model. This is also true if the elapsed unemployment duration t is included in 2,
taking account of the endogeneity of t by using an ancillary equation for t.
In order to apply the Hausman tests we need the estimates of the ordered
probit  analysis. These are presented in Table 3 along with the corresponding
scaled ML estimates for the whole  data set. The latter  are merely transformations
of the estimates in Table 2 and are reproduced here to facilitate a comparison
with the ordered probit  estimates. At first glance it seems that the differences
between the two sets of estimates are very  small. The Hausman test statistic  for
the comparison of the two sets of /?i/a,  estimates has a xf,, distribution under
the nul1  hypothesis of a correct model specification.  The value of this statistic
equals 0.4, which is way below the 90% critical value of this distribution (which
is 16.0). The Hausman test statistic  for the comparison of the two complete
sets of estimates (that is, the /3i/cr,,  (cg  -  &)/a,  and (ci -  &,)/a,  estimates) has
a J&  distribution under the nul1  hypothesis. The value of this statistic  equals
1.5, which again is much  smaller than the 90% critical value of this distribution
(which is 18.5). So these tests support our model specification.  In particular, the
quantitative responses in the Case 11 group are governed by the same behavior
as the qualitative self-classifications of the respondents over the three cases.
mate are the parameters of the utility function that represent the utility trade-off
between the wage and the commuting time.  The relation between these parame-
ters and the observed reservation wages follows from a genera1 nonstationary job
search model in which jobs have multiple characteristics. Such  an estimation pro-
cedure avoids the need to make the strong functional form assumptions usually
made in structural analyses of job search.
When  specifying the empirical model specification we have paid substantial
attention to measurement errors and specification errors. Some of the estima-
tion issues may be of more genera1 interest, notably for the analysis of limited-
dependent variable models with unknown threshold values.
The results indicate that the disutility of commuting time  is particularly high
for females with children. Indeed,  their reservation wage for jobs requiring two
times  one hour of commuting time  a day often exceeds the maximum possible
offered wage. In that case job search wil1  be restricted to jobs located within a
very smal1 distance. The disutility of commuting time  can therefore be identified
as a factor having  a negative impact on the labor market performance of females
with children. It may be that this effect can be reduced by subsidizing the the
costs  of child  care. Child care facilities in The Netherlands were notoriously
bad in the mid-eighties, which is the period in which our data were collected.
However,  it is clear that, to address  this policy issue, additional research would
be necessary.
The results also indicate that the disutility of commuting is larger in rural
areas than it is in highly urbanized areas. This may have to do with the fact
that commuting trips in highly urbanized areas can be combined  more easily
with trips for other purposes. It may also  be a consequente  of the fact  that the
physical distance that can be reached in a one hour commuting trip during rush
hours is smaller in an urbanized area than in a rural area.
The specification tests al1 support the model specification. It may be inter-
esting to examine whether other observed variables that, according to the job
search model, are endogenous (notably unemployment duration), can be used to
extract additional information on the parameters of interest. Gronberg & Reed
(1994) use data on job durations and transitions from one type of job to another
to estimate the willingness to pay for certain job characteristics. The integration
of such an analysis with the analysis of the present paper is beyond the scope of
this paper, but seems to be an interesting topic for further research.
We finish this paper by making  some remarks on the use of subjective  re-
sponses on reservation wages for different types of jobs. First of all, the idea of
using of such responses for the estimation of the willingness to pay for commuting
25
time  can be fruitfully extended to other job attributes. In that case, responses
must be available on reservation wages for jobs differing in the degree in which
the attribute is provided. It is obviously important to phrase the questions in
such a way that it is clear which characteristics the job one refers to has. In our
case, it would be better if the question that we refer to as the question on B(O)
would explicitly refer to a job on a zero commuting time  distance. However,  it
is also important that the type of job one refers to is a conceivable kind of job,
so it would be even better if this question would refer to jobs on a fixed minima1
commuting time  distance (like 15 minutes).
In our application, the response we denote by J(l)  is quite often the same as
the response we denote by Q(O). To investigate whether this is due to a misun-
derstanding of the question concerning jobs on a one hour distance, or  whether
the respondent’s utility would only be substantially affected by commuting times
exceeding one hour, it would be helpful if the respondent would be asked ad-
ditional reservation wage questions concerning jobs requiring other commuting
times  (say, 1.5 hours). This would also enable the estimation of non-linearities in
the willingness to pay as a function of commuting time  (or, more general,  the job
characteristic). However,  the latter  can also be achieved by random assignment
over respondents of questions referring to different commuting times.
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FIGURE 2 RESERVATION WAGE DIFFERENCES
FDR  THE SECOND  GROUP (CASE 11)
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Table 1. Sample Means
variable
Independent variables
mean
gender  (female= 1) 0.43
age (in years) 34
educational leve1 (1,..,6) 3 .2
married or  living together 0.53
number of children at home (when  female) 0.34
regional unemployment rate  (in %) 19
degree of urbanisation 9 .5
Dependent variables
qualitative, for d;(l) - 6(O):
l no differente
l positive differente
l infinite differente
continuous, for positive differente:
3(l)  - J(O) (in Dfl per month)
0.54
0 .31
0.15
235.8
sample size 238
Note: the value of the variable educational leve1 denotes the highest attained leve1 ac-
cording  to the traditional classification  of the Dutch educational system into six levels
of ascending advancement: 1) less  than completed primary education; 2) completed
primary education; 3) lower secondary education, either in the genera1 stream (MAVO
or at most 3 years of HAVO or VWO) or the vocational stream (LBO); 4) secondary
education, again either in the genera1 stream (completed HAVO or VWO) or the voca-
tional stream (MBO); 5) higher  vocational (HBO) or incomplete college training; and
6) university graduation.
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Table 2. Estimates for the Full Model
variable/parameter
Disutility of commuting time (/3)
estimate (s.e.) estimate (s.e.)
person-specific  characteristics:
gender  (female= 1) 0.78 (0.83) -
age (in years) -0.038 (0.033) -
educational leve1 (1,..,6) -0.16 (0.32) -
household-specific  characteristics:
married or living together 1.10 (0.73) 0.78 (0.70)
number of children at home (when  female) 1.42 (0.52) 1.67 (0.44)
environment-related  features:
regional unemployment rate (in %) -0.035 (0.024) -0.027 (0.023)
degree of urbanisation -0.29 (0.11) -0.29 (0.11)
constant 3.80 (1.96) 2.33 (1.27)
Threshold values
lower threshold (cu)
upper  threshold (cl)
Error standard deviations
0.57 (0.12) 0.57 (0.12)
5.25 (0.16) 5.25 (32.8)
specification  error (0,) 4.41 (0.48) 4.49 (0.49)
measurement error (0,) 0.19 (0.085) 0.19 (0.086)
Note: standard errors are in parentheses.
The monetary unit is Dfl 100 (which is about US $ 60),
and the time unit is one month.
30
Table 3. Estimates for the Ordered Probit  Model and Corresponding Scaled
Estimates for the Full Model
variable/parameter
Disutility of commuting time (pl/~,)
person-specific  chamcteristics:
gender  (female= 1)
age (in years)
educational leve1 (1,. . ,S)
household-specific  characteristics:
married or living together
number of children at home (when female)
enuironment-related  features:
regional unemployment rate  (in %)
degree of urbanisation
Threshold values
lower threshold ((cg - ,f3o)/0~)
upper  threshold ((cl - /3o)/a,)
ordered probit
estimate (s.e.1
0.22 (0.20)
-0.009 (0.008)
-0.051 (0.075)
0.23 (0.17)
0.30 (0.11)
-0.008 (0.005)
-0.075 (0.027)
-0.91 (0.51)
0.13 (0.58)
full model
estimate (s.e.)
0.18 (0.19)
-0.009 (0.008)
-0.037 (0.071)
0.25 (0.16)
0.32 (0.11)
-0.008 (0.005)
-0.065 (0.024)
-0.73 (0.44)
0.33 (0.45)
Note:  standard errors are in parentheses. The estimates for the full model in the last
two columns are calculated from  the results reported in Table 2.
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